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Abstract 
 
We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and government 
constraints on university licensing performance. We develop and test a simple contracting 
model of technology licensing offices, using new survey information together with panel 
data on U.S. universities for 1995-99. We find that private universities are much more 
likely to adopt incentive pay than public ones, but ownership does not affect licensing 
performance conditional on the use of incentive pay. Adopting incentive pay is associated 
with about 30-40 percent more income per license. Universities with strong local 
development objectives generate about 30 percent less income per license, but are more 
likely to license to local (in-state) startup companies. Stronger government constraints are 
‘costly’ in terms of foregone license income and startup activity. These results are robust 
to controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
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1. Introduction
Empirical studies demonstrate that university research has real eﬀects, enhancing inno-
vation and productivity in private firms. This works through two main channels — pure
knowledge spillovers and licensing of university inventions.1 Patenting and licensing by
universities has grown sharply and has become an active public policy issue in the U.S.
From 1991-2004, patent applications by U.S. universities rose from 1,584 to 10,517 and
license income increased from $218 million to $1.4 billion, which is about six percent of
federal R&D financing for universities.2 This rapid growth was partly associated with the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which gave universities ownership of inventions from federally-
funded research. Today all research universities have technology licensing oﬃces (TLO’s)
and intellectual property policies.3 This paper studies how economic incentives and insti-
tutional arrangements aﬀect university technology licensing performance.
Technology transfer involves two distinct activities: innovation by faculty scientists
and commercialization by the TLO. Scientists produce both publications and inventions
in response to monetary and other incentives (e.g., promotion and tenure rules and in-
trinsic motivation).4 Lach and Schankerman (2003) show that royalty sharing incentives
for scientists strongly aﬀect innovation and licensing outcomes. The eﬀectiveness of com-
mercialization by university technology licensing oﬃces — which decide whether to patent
and license inventions, identify licensees and structure contracts — is shaped by the univer-
1Leading studies on the knowledge spillovers from university research include Jaﬀe (1989) and Adams
(1990). On the geographic localisation of such spillovers, see Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993; and
Audretsch and Stephan, 1996. There is also a growing empirical literature on patenting and technology
transfer by universities, and by national research laboratories (e.g., Henderson, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg,
1998; Jaﬀe and Lerner, 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; and Siegel, Waldman and Link, 2003).
2The figures are computed from information in the FY 2004 Licensing Survey, Association of University
Technology Managers. The patenting licensing information includes all universities and hospitals that
responded to the AUTM surveys in the respective years.
3There was some technology transfer prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, though the transaction costs and un-
certainty of property rights undermined widespread activity. For a more skeptical view of the contribution
of the Bayh-Dole Act to the growth of technology licensing, see Mowery and Zeidonis (2001).
4For discussion see Dasgupta and David (1994). Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein (2005) provide an in-
teresting theoretical analysis of the functions of university and private sector research and the implications
for incentive structures.
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sity’s objectives, government constraints, and incentives within the TLO. Improving TLO
productivity is especially important because, under prevailing arrangements in the U.S.,
universities have monopsony control (‘right of first refusal’) over commercialisation.
A number of papers have shown that technology transfer performance is influenced by
university characteristics and other factors, including university ownership (public versus
private), academic quality, local (high-tech) demand conditions and license contract de-
sign.(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002;
Siegel,Waldman and Link, 2003; and DiGregorio and Shane, 2003; Elfenbein, 2004). These
studies explore a variety of diﬀerent outcome measures, including the number of patents
and licenses, license income, and the formation of start-up companies. Our paper extends
the literature by focusing more on the ‘black box’ of productivity within the technology
licensing oﬃce.
We focus on three key determinants of productivity: performance pay, local devel-
opment objectives, and government constraints on licensing activity. Labor economists
have studied the impact of performance pay on output and earnings in various contexts
(Lazear, 2000b, and the literature cited there). To our knowledge, this paper and Lach
and Schankerman (2003) are the only studies of how monetary incentives aﬀect perfor-
mance in not-for-profit organizations, in this case universities. Universities have various
objectives in undertaking technology transfer. Survey data used in this paper show that
the two main objectives are generating license income and promoting local and regional
development, the latter being more prominent in public universities. Institutions that view
local economic development as one of their primary functions might perform diﬀerently
from those that exclusively pursue income maximization. Finally, state governments often
impose a variety of constraints — both statutory restrictions and informal political pres-
sure — on licensing activity in public universities. In this paper we quantify the impact of
incentives and measure the implicit cost of local development objectives and government
constraints in terms of foregone license income.
We develop a simple contracting model in which the university TLO uses performance
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pay to incentivize workers, but there is a divergence of interests. In addition to total
license income, we assume that the TLO attaches a premium to income generated in the
‘local’ market, but workers do not share this local development objective. The model
generates the following predictions: (1) the use of performance pay should be more likely
when universities give less weight to local development objectives and are less constrained
by government, (2) the use of performance pay should increase the level of income per
license (and possibly the number of licenses), (3) strong local development objectives
should reduce income per license (but possibly increase the number of licenses), and (4)
government constraints should reduce income per license.5
The empirical analysis is based on new survey data combined with panel data from
public sources on 86 U.S. universities for the period 1995-99. The key results can be sum-
marized as follows. First, universities are more likely to adopt performance pay when they
are private, when they place less weight on local development objectives and when they
are less constrained by state government. This evidence is consistent with the predictions
of the theoretical literature on the adoption of incentives in public organizations.6 How-
ever, while private ownership has a large, positive eﬀect on the adoption of incentive pay,
ownership has no independent eﬀect on licensing performance, conditional on the adoption
of incentive pay. Second, incentives have strong performance eﬀects. Universities that use
bonus pay generate, on average, about 30-40 percent more income per license.7 Taken
together, these two findings suggest that it may be possible to get ‘private performance’
out of public institutions if the right incentives are introduced.
5While the model is based on the eﬀort eﬀect of incentives, we recognise (as emphasised by Lazear,
2000a and 2000b) that performance pay can improve productivity both by providing greater incentives
for eﬀort and by improving positive sorting of workers. The impacts of performance pay estimated in this
paper capture both eﬀects. We do not have any individual level data, and thus cannot separately identify
the pure incentive (eﬀort) and sorting eﬀects.
6This literature shows that high-powered incentives are less likely to be adopted in public organizations
because of the problem of multiple principals (Berheim and Whinston, 1986; Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1988; Dixit, 1997), output measurement and monitoring (Prendergast, 2002) and stronger intrinsic moti-
vation in such organizations (Francois, 2000; Besley and Ghatak, 2006).
7This estimate is broadly similar to other estimates in the literature, including the well known study
of the productivity gains from piece work pay in an automotive glass manufacturing firm (Lazear, 2000b),
and more recent work by Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005, 2006).
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Third, we find that local development objectives are ‘costly’ in terms of foregone license
income. Universities with strong local development objectives generate, on average, about
30 percent less income per license. The standard argument for having a local licensing
preference is that it increases localised knowledge spillovers and the agglomeration eﬀects
emphasized by the new economic geography literature. We provide some evidence that
universities with strong local development objectives are more likely to establish start-up
companies in the state rather than outside it. But a full evaluation of whether localised
spillovers are stronger for such universities in beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless,
the large opportunity cost of promoting local development through licensing highlights
the importance of comparing this policy to the alternative policy of maximizing licensing
income and using the additional income to finance local economic development in other
ways (e.g. lower business taxes or direct subsidy programs).
Finally, we find that state government constraints reduce license income — the estimated
shadow price of an additional ‘eﬀective constraint’ (as defined in Section 3) is a 17 percent
reduction in license income. Universities that are more strongly constrained are also less
likely to license through new start-up companies (rather than existing firms).
The main econometric concern is the potential endogeniety of incentives due to un-
observed heterogeneity (e.g. commercial orientation) that aﬀects both the university’s
licensing performance and adoption of incentive pay. We do not have variation over time
in our measures of performance pay and thus cannot use university fixed eﬀects to address
this issue. We adopt the approach developed by Blundell, Griﬃth and van Reenen (1999)
by using information on the pre-sample license income and patenting by the university to
capture unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, we control for whether the university is
private, which should be correlated with commercial orientation.
The findings in this paper contribute to the policy debate about the eﬀectiveness of
university licensing activity, but the paper is not a cost-benefit analysis of the ’commer-
cialisation’ of universities. Many scholars have expressed concerns about the potential
costs of these developments, including the threat to established norms of open science and
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the redirection of research away from fundamental science.8 While important, these issues
are beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Sections 3 and
4 we describe the data and present the empirical specification. Section 5 presents and
discusses the implications of the parametric estimates of the model (nonparametric results
are included in an appendix), followed by brief concluding remarks.
2. Analytical Framework
The university technology licensing oﬃce (TLO) hires a worker who licenses inventions to
private firms. Inventions can be licensed in the local market (L) or the national market
(N). Licensing an invention in market i = L,N takes µi units of eﬀort and generates
revenue λpi. The parameter λ ≤ 1 captures the eﬀect of government constraints on the
TLO that lower the payoﬀ to licensing. We assume pN > pL and µN > µL, and normalize
the number of inventions to unity.
The worker allocates her eﬀort between licensing inventions in the local and national
markets. Let β denote the fraction of eﬀort devoted to licensing in the national market,
so total eﬀort is e = βµN + (1− β)µL. Eﬀort costs are C(e) = 12e2.
The TLO oﬀers a compensation package involving a wage w ≥ 0 and a high-powered
incentive in the form of a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the licensing revenues.9 The TLO has two
objectives — earning license income and promoting local development. License income
is R = βλpN + (1 − β)λpL. We model the local development objective by assuming that
the TLO places a premium on generating license income from the local area, in addition
to the total income it retains, (1 − α)R. Letting ∆p = pN − pL and ∆µ = µN − µL, the
8For a thoughtful analysis of these issues, see Dasgupta and David (1994). There is very limited
empirical work on the impact of such activity on open science and research orientation. Recent work
includes Agarwal and Henderson (2002) and Murray and Stern (2006).
9We assume that the TLO cannot use diﬀerent sharing rates for revenue raised in the local and national
markets (we have no evidence that would allow us to investigate this). We also rule out the possiibility
that the worker pays the TLO for employment (w < 0) and is compensated by revenue sharing.
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objective function is
V = (1− α)λ{β∆p+ pL}+ δ(1− β)λpL − w (2.1)
The parameter δ ≥ 0 reflects the premium attached to local development.
The first best allocation where β.is contractible solves
max
β
V = βλ∆p+ λpL + δ(1− β)λpL − w s.t. U(w, β) = w −
1
2
(β∆µ+ µL)
2 ≥ U0
where U0 is the worker’s reservation value. This yields
β∗∗ = max
½
λ(∆p− δpL)− µL∆µ
(∆µ)2
, 0
¾
Now suppose that the TLO cannot contract over β.10 The TLO sets the compensa-
tion package (w,α) subject to the incentive compatibility constraint that the worker sets
optimal eﬀort. The benefit to the TLO of a higher α is that it induces more eﬀort on
high-revenue licensing. The cost is that the TLO retains less of the revenue generated.
The trade-oﬀ determines the optimal α.
Under incentive compatibility, the worker solves
max
β
U(β) = αλ{β∆p+ pL}+ w − 1
2
(β∆µ+ µL)
2 s.t. U(β) ≥ U0
=⇒ β∗ = max
½
αλ∆p− µL∆µ
(∆µ)2
, 0
¾
Since the worker has no preference for local development, there is a divergence between
her objectives and those of the TLO.11 Note that even if the worker retains all the license
income (α = 1), β∗ > β∗∗ as long as δ > 0. If the TLO has a local development objective,
it wants to tilt eﬀort more toward licensing in the local market, relative to the allocation
made by the worker. Since we assume the TLO cannot set diﬀerent revenue sharing rates
10This can arise either because the worker’s eﬀort is not observable to the TLO or not verifiable to third
parties.
11Such a preference might arise if workers in technology licensing oﬃces sort across universities on this
dimension.
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for license income in local and national markets, the only way the TLO can lower the
worker’s choice of β is to reduce the high-powered incentive, α.
Given β∗(α), the university solves
max
α,w
V = (1− α)λ{β∗(α)∆p+ pL}+ δ(1− β∗(α))λpL − w
s.t. U(β∗) = αλ{β∗(α)∆p+ pL}+ w − 1
2
(β∗(α)∆µ+ µL)
2 ≥ U0
Assuming the participation constraint binds, the first order condition is
Vα = {λ∆p− δλpL − (β∗(α)∆µ+ µL)∆µ}
∂β∗(α)
∂α
= 0 (2.2)
which yields the optimal revenue sharing
α∗ = max
½
1− δpL
∆p
, 0
¾
=⇒ ∂α
∗
∂δ
≤ 0 (2.3)
The optimal revenue share for the worker is non-increasing in the weight the TLO attaches
to local development objectives.12
In the data we observe whether or not the university adopts performance-based pay,
but not the actual revenue sharing parameter, α∗. To examine how the local development
objective aﬀects the adoption probability, suppose there is a fixed cost of introducing
incentive pay, F. The TLO introduces (optimal) incentive pay if the gain exceeds the cost:
∆V (θ) = V (α∗; θ) − V (0; θ) ≥ F, where θ = (δ, pL, pN , µL, µN , U0). Using equation (2)
and recalling that β∗ = 0 when α = 0,we get ∆V (θ) = 1
2
(β∗(α∗)∆µ)2. It is easy to verify
that ∂∆V (θ)∂δ ≤ 0 and
∂∆V (θ)
∂λ ≥ 0, which imply:
Prediction 1: Universities that care more about local development (higher δ) are less
likely to adopt incentive pay.
12Two points should be noted. First, if δ = 0 the TLO wants to give maximum incentives to the worker,
α = 1. However, then V > 0 only if the TLO charges the worker for the right to work (w < 0). If we rule
this out, the optimal policy is to set α < 1 that satisfies the participation constraint for w = 0. Second,
the optimal revenue sharing is independent of the constraint parameter λ because we have assumed that
the latter aﬀects local and national licensing the same way.
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Prediction 2: Universities that are more constrained (lower λ) are less likely to adopt
incentive pay.
We examine how incentive pay, local development objectives and constraints aﬀect
total license income earned by the university, which is what we observe in the data. With
optimal incentive pay, license income is given by R∗ = β∗(α∗)λ∆p + λpL. The eﬀect of
adopting (optimal) incentive pay is ∆R = R(α∗; θ)−R(0; θ) = β∗(α∗)λ∆p > 0 :
Prediction 3: Universities which use incentive pay generate greater license income per
license.
It is easy to verify that ∂R
∗
∂δ ≤ 0 and
∂R∗
∂λ ≥ 0, where these derivatives take into
account the impact of δ and λ on the optimal revenue sharing decision, α∗. These results
imply:
Prediction 4: Universities that care more about local development (higher δ) generate
less license income per license.
Prediction 5 : Universities that are more constrained (lower λ) earn less license income
per license.
We have interpreted the local development objective as a preference for generating
license income in the local market. An alternative interpretation is that the university
places weight on the number of licenses it issues on its inventions in the local market
(rather than the local license income).13 In this case the objective function would be:
V = (1−α)λ{β∆p+pL}+δ(1−β)−w. It is straightforward to show that Predictions 1-5
continue to hold in this case. In addition, we get the prediction that the number of licenses
in the local market (1 − β) increases when incentives are used, when local development
objectives are stronger (higher δ), and when constraints are more severe (lower λ).
13In the survey, 52 universities rank the number of licenses as a very important objective, 24 as moder-
ately important and 10 as relatively unimportant or unimportant (the survey does not distinguish between
local and non-local in this respect). The average shares of non-exclusive in total licenses for these groups
of universities are, repectively, 68 percent, 82 percent and 88 percent.
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3. Data Description
This paper combines data from three main sources: (1) a new survey of technology licensing
oﬃces in public and private universities in the United States, (2) annual surveys published
by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), and (3) patent data from
the USPTO (available at the NBER archive).
Survey: We conducted a survey of TLO directors in late 2003. The survey was sent
to about 200 U.S. and Canadian research universities that belong to the AUTM, from
which we received 102 responses. After matching to other data for the empirical analysis,
the final sample consists of 86 universities. We ran sample selection regressions using
as controls the sample mean of TLO age, TLO size, license income per active license,
number of licenses executed per invention disclosure, and dummy variable for whether
the university is private and whether it has a medical school. Only the medical school
dummy has a significant (positive) coeﬃcient in the selection equation (pseudo-R2 = .13,
p-value<.001). Importantly, the response probability is not systematically related to the
private status of the university or either of the two measures of licensing performance
which we later use in the econometric analysis.
In addition to descriptive information about the TLO, the survey focused on three
key areas: (1) the use of performance-based pay (merit pay or bonuses), (2) the relative
importance of diﬀerent objectives in their licensing activity, and (3) informal and formal
government constraints on TLO operations.14
On incentives, the survey asked whether the TLO uses some form of performance-based
pay for its professional staﬀ — either merit pay or bonuses. We define a dummy variable for
the TLO’s that use merit pay and another for bonus pay. These indicators of performance-
based pay include both cases where the pay is based on subjective and objective measures
of performance, and on the basis of individual or group performance.15 Bonuses are a more
14The survey questionaire is available from the authors on request.
15For a theoretical analysis of incentives based on objective and subjective performance measures, see
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994). Our survey contains some information on these two characteris-
tics, but the data were not rich enough to allow us to diﬀerentiate performance-based pay along these
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high-powered incentive because they are more directly linked to objective performance
outcomes. We do not have any information on the size of performance-related pay.
On objectives, the survey asked to assess the importance of diﬀerent objectives of the
TLO (as very important, moderately important, relatively unimportant or unimportant).
These objectives include (but are not limited to) the number of licenses executed, the
amount of license income generated, and the promotion of local and regional economic
development (i.e., a preference for licensing to local firms, even if it does not maximize
licensing revenue). Inspection of the survey data shows that the only objective for which
universities diﬀer substantially is local and regional development.16 For this reason, we fo-
cus our attention in this paper on this objective. We define a set of dummy variables that
reflect the importance of the local development objective: LOCDEV=High (‘very impor-
tant’) and LOCDEV=Medium (‘relatively important’); the reference category corresponds
to ‘relatively unimportant’ or ‘unimportant’.
Finally, the survey asked about the importance of six diﬀerent (formal or informal) con-
straints on licensing operations that are imposed by state government, using the same de-
scriptions as for local development objectives. The constraints cover the choice of licensees,
license contract terms, the use of equity stakes (rather than royalties), and provisions re-
garding confidentiality, indemnification and dispute resolution. We define a variable that
counts the number of constraints for which the TLO reports ‘moderately important’ or
‘very important’. We have no information when these constraints were introduced.
AUTM: Data on licensing income, the number of new licenses executed, the stock of
active licenses, the number of inventions disclosed, and descriptive information about the
TLO (size and age) and the university are taken from the Annual Surveys of the Associ-
ation of University Technology Managers (AUTM). The AUTM surveys cover the period
dimensions
16For the local development objective, 29 universities rank it as very important as compared to 20
who say that it is relatively unimportant or unimportant (the rest rank it as moderately important). By
contrast, for the number of licenses executed, 51 universities rank it as a very important objective and
only 10 say that it is relatively unimportant or unimportant. This latter characterization also holds for
the other objectives in the survey.
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1991-2001, but for the set of variables we need the usable sample period is 1995-2001.17
The final data set is an unbalanced panel of 521 observations covering 86 universities. The
AUTM data are at the university level aggregated across technology fields; there is no
information for separate technology areas or for individual innovations.
USPTO: For each university we construct a “pre-sample” measure of the stock of
patents held by each university as of 1990. We use this measure to capture unobserved
heterogeneity that may be due to variations across universities in their commercial ori-
entation or capacity. To construct the pre-sample patents, we matched the names of
universities in our sample to the complete list of assignees to any patent applications filed
(and subsequently issued) in the USPTO during the period 1969-1990.
Technology composition of faculty: We collected information from the National Re-
search Council (part of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences) on the distribution of
faculty across hard science departments in order to construct measures of university spe-
cialization in diﬀerent research areas.18 This information is provided only for U.S. univer-
sities. For Canadian institutions we constructed a measure of the faculty size by hand,
using the lists of full time faculty for each of the 23 hard science departments covered
by the NRC, as provided on the university websites, and then aggregated up to the six
categories used in this paper.
High-tech density (TechPole index): We measure high-tech density (to proxy the local
demand for licensing) by the TechPole index, constructed by the Milken Institute (Devol
and Wong, 1999). The index a composite of the share of national high-tech real output
17Information on the stock of active licenses (which generate observed license income) is only available
for the subperiod 1995-2001. Also note that licensing income includes all license fees, running royalties,
and the cash value of equity when sold.
18The NRC provides full-time faculty size for 23 diﬀerent doctoral programs, which we aggregate into
six science fields. We use the shares of faculty employed in each field to proxy for the research orientation
of the university. The fields are: (1) Biomedical and Genetics (biochemical/molecular biology, cell and
development biology, biomedical engineering and molecular and general genetics), (2) Other Biological
Sciences (neurosciences, pharmacology, physiology and ecology/evolution and behavior), (3) Computer
Science, (4) Chemical Science (chemistry and chemical engineering), (5) Engineering (aerospace, civil
engineering, electrical engineering, industrial engineering, material science, and mechanical engineering),
and (6) Physical Sciences (astrophysics/astronomy, geosciences, mathematics, oceanography, physics, and
statistics/biomedical statistics).
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and the concentration of high-tech industries for each U.S. metropolitan area. The index
ranges from zero to a maximum value of about 23 for Silicon Valley. We assign each
university the index for the metropolitan area nearest to the university location (main
campus). For the Canadian universities, we use a ranking of the high-tech density of U.S.
and Canadian cities and assign each Canadian university the average TechPole index for
the next highest and lowest U.S. cities in the ranking.19
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Table 2 provides more detailed
information about how the key survey variables vary with university ownership, size, and
high-tech density. Note first that the use of high-powered incentives is strongly linked
to ownership — private universities are much more likely to use some form of incentive
pay than public institutions. Incentives are also more common in larger TLO’s (where
direct monitoring of performance is likely to be more diﬃcult), and in universities lo-
cated in high-tech areas. Second, private universities are much less likely to pursue local
development objectives than public ones, but this does not vary with TLO size or high-
tech density. Third, government constraints are important only for public universities (no
private university reports more than two constraints being important).
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
These facts have two further implications linked to the model’s predictions. First,
universities that attach low weight to local development objectives (LOCDEV=Low) are
twice as likely to adopt the highest powered incentive (bonus pay), as compared to uni-
versities with strong development objectives (LOCDEV=High) — 21 versus 10 percent,
respectively. Second, universities that are less constrained by government regulations
(NumConst< 3) are twice as likely to adopt bonus pay as compared to more constrained
universities (NumConst≥ 3) — 20 versus 10 percent, respectively. These simple results are
consistent with Predictions 1 and 2 of the model.
To investigate further, we conduct Probit estimation of the determinants of adopting
19The ranking was taken from “Competing on Creativity, A Report prepared for the Ontario Ministry
of Entrerprise, Opportunity and Innovation and the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity” (
November 2002), by Mric Gertler, Richard Florida, Gary Gates and Tara Vinodrai. Downloaded from
www.creativeclass.org/acrobat/jan2003_canada.pdf
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bonus incentives (Table 3). We start with a specification that includes only a private own-
ership dummy, which is positive and significant. The coeﬃcient on the private ownership
dummy is robust to adding controls for observed heterogengeneity (column 2), and the
implied eﬀect of university ownership is large — moving from public to private doubles the
probability of using bonus pay (from the mean of 35 to 71 percent). This finding that
ownership strongly aﬀects the adoption of incentive pay is robust to adding pre-sample
patenting to control for unobserved heterogeneity (column 4).20 However, it is not possible
to disentangle the separate eﬀect of private ownership from those of local development ob-
jectives and constraints because of the strong correlation among these variables (column
5). If we drop the private ownership dummy (column 5), we find that incentive pay is
negatively and significantly associated with the number of government constraints, but
not with local development objectives. This supports Prediction 2, but not Prediction 1,
of the model.
[Table 3 about here]
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we present nonparametric evidence linking
incentives, local development objectives and constraints to licensing performance. Figures
1 and 2 present smoothed cumulative distribution functions of income per active license
and the number of licenses per invention disclosed (averaged over time) for universities
grouped according to whether they use bonus incentives, the strength of local development
objectives, and the severity of government constraints. It is clear that the distribution
of income per license for universities that use bonus pay stochastically dominates the
distribution for those that do not. This also very nearly holds for universities that are less
constrained and that place less weight on local development. The eﬀects of bonus pay and
constraints are less clear-cut for the number of licenses per invention, but there is some
evidence that stronger local development objectives are associated with more licenses per
invention. The next sections provide an econometric analysis of these relationships.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
20In sharp contrast, we show in Section 5 that private ownership does not have any independent eﬀect
on licensing outcomes, once we control for the use of incentive pay.
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4. Empirical Specification
4.1. License income equation
The baseline specification links licensing income to incentives, local development objectives
and constraints, as follows:
log(LicInc)it = β
I
0 + β
I
1 log(LicExec)it + β
I
2DumMeriti + β
I
3DumBonusi
+βI4LOCDEV_Medi + β
I
5LOCDEV_Highi + β
I
6NumConsti
+βI7Intervene × NumConsti + Z 0itφI + τ It + Iit (4.1)
where the superscript I refers to the license income equation, and i and t denote university
and year, respectively. The variables are defined as follows: LicInc is the annual flow of
licensing income, LicExec is the cumulative number (stock) of active licenses held by
the TLO, DumMerit is a dummy variable that equals one if the TLO uses merit pay,
DumBonus is a dummy variable that equals one if the TLO pays bonuses as part of
the compensation scheme, LOCDEV_Med and LOCDEV_High are dummy variables
denoting medium and strong local development objectives of the TLO (the reference
category is no/weak objectives), Numconst is the number of constraints the TLO reports
as important or very important, Intervene is a dummy variable equal to one if the TLO
reports that the university frequently intervenes in its decision-making, Z is a vector of
additional controls, τ It is a complete set of year dummies, and 
I
it is an error term. The
control variables include the share of faculty in diﬀerent fields of research, dummies for
whether the university is private or public and whether it has a medical school, pre-
sample patents and others.21 The equation is estimated by generalized least squares with
standard errors that allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation
(AR(1)).22
21In some specifications we also control for the number of inventions disclosed (by the faculty) to the
university TLO in order to capture the size of the available ‘pool’ of inventions that can be licensed.
22We also estimated the equations using a more general error specification, allowing AR(2) with arbi-
trary heteroskedasticity. The estimated parameters and standard errors are very similar.
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Based on the analysis in Section 2, we expect the following signs for the coeﬃcients of
interest (prediction from the model): βI3 > β
I
2 ≥ 0 (Prediction 3), βI5 < βI4 < 0 (Prediction
4), and βI6 < 0 (Prediction 5). Finally we expect β
I
7 > 0 if the university intervenes to
mitigate the eﬀect of government constraints. This would be expected if the university
and TLO have aligned objectives, as assumed in the model.
On final point should be noted on the interpretation of the coeﬃcients βI2 and β
I
3. As
emphasized by Lazear (2000a, 2000b), performance based pay can improve performance
both by providing greater incentives to existing workers to increase eﬀort and by improving
positive sorting (higher productivity workers moving to TLO’s that oﬀer performance pay).
The coeﬃcients on the merit and bonus pay dummy variables capture both eﬀects. Since
we do not have individual-level data, we cannot separately identify the pure incentive
(eﬀort) and sorting eﬀects.
There is a concern that the estimates of βI2 and β
I
3 may be upward biased by unobserved
heterogeneity, e.g. diﬀerences in commercial orientation (this also applies to the equation
for the number of licenses below). Because we do not have variation over time in incentive
pay, we cannot use university fixed eﬀects here. We follow the approach developed by
Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (1999) and Blundell, Griﬃth and Windmeijer (2002).
They show that, under certain assumptions, the pre-sample mean of the dependent variable
is a consistent estimator of the unobserved, fixed heterogeneity, and thus can be used to
control for such heterogeneity. We do this in two ways. First, we use the mean of license
income for the period 1991-94 as a control in the regression on the 1995-99 sample. Because
of missing observations, we have only 66 universities in this exercise. In addition, we use
pre-sample data on patenting for the period 1965-90 (both patent counts and citations),
which is available for the full sample of 86 universities.23 Finally, we include a dummy
variable for whether the university is private or public, since ownership type is likely to
be correlated with commercial orientation.
23We actually use the log of one plus the number of patent counts, so as not to discard universities
with zero pre-sample patents, and add a dummy variable for these observations. It is worth noting that
the within-sample (1995-99) correlation between the log of patent counts and the log of license income is
high, at 0.67.
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4.2. Number of licenses equation
The baseline specification links the annual flow of licenses executed by the TLO to incen-
tives, objectives and constraints, as follows:
log(Licenses)it = β
N
0 + β
N
1 log(Inventions)it + β
N
2 DumMeriti + β
N
3 DumBonusi
+βN4 LOCDEV_Medi + β
N
5 HighLOCDEV_Highi + β
N
6 NumConsti
+βN7 Intervene× NumConsti + Z 0itφN + τNt + Nit (4.2)
where the superscriptN refers to the number of licenses equation. Following the model, we
summarize the parameter predictions as follows. First, we expect high powered incentives
to improve performance, so βN3 > β
N
2 ≥ 0. Second, it is easier for the TLO to monitor
the number of licenses a worker generates (from a given stock of inventions), as compared
to the license income generated relative to what might have been earned by more eﬀort.
Because of this diﬀerence, we expect the adoption of any form of incentive pay to have a
smaller impact on the number of licenses than on the level of license income: βN2 < β
I
2 and
βN3 < β
I
3. Finally, we expect the impact of local development objectives on the number
of licenses is likely to be positive rather than negative. Universities that care about local
development are more likely to license inventions non-exclusively — which generates less
license income but a larger number of licenses on the available inventions. The survey
evidence confirms this conjecture.24 Thus we expect βN5 > β
N
4 ≥ 0.
4.3. Start-ups equations
We use two equations, one for the number of university startup companies and a second
for the location of those startups. Since the number of startups is a count variable, we
24For the sample as a whole, exclusive licenses account for 64.7 percent of all licenses executed, but the
ratio diﬀers significantly with the strength of local development objectives. For universities that do not
care at all about local development (LOCDEV=Low), the ratio is 68.1 percent (s.e.=0.19). For universities
with a moderate local development objective (LOCDEV=Medium), the share is 66.4 (s.e.=0.22), and for
those with strong objectives, it is 60.2 (s.e.=0.23).
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use a negative binomial specification for both equations. The first links the annual flow of
university start-ups to the flow of licenses executed, incentives, objectives and constraints:
E(Startups)it = β
S
0 + β
S
1 log(Licenses)it + β
S
2 log(Inventions)it + β
S
3DumMeriti +
βS4DumBonusi + β
S
5LOCDEV_Medi + β
S
6HighLOCDEV_Highi +
βS7NumConsti + Z
0
itφ
S + τSt + 
S
it (4.3)
Startups are one mode of licensing (the other is to existing firms). There is no reason
that high-powered incentives should aﬀect the choice of licensing mode. The same holds for
local development objectives, since a local licensing preference can be pursued with either
licensing mode. Thus we expect βS3 = β
S
4 = β
S
5 = β
S
6 = 0. However, licensing to startups
is typically much more risky than licensing to existing firms. Since the survey indicates
that restrictions on indemnification and dispute resolution are the most frequently cited
as ‘important’ constraints, we expect that more constrained universities will be less likely
to license via startups — βS7 < 0.
The second equation links the number of university start-ups established in the state
where the university is located to the number of total start-ups, incentives, objectives and
constraints:
E(LocalStartups)it = β
L
0 + β
L
1 log(Inventions)it + β
L
2Start psit + β
L
3DumMeriti +
βL4DumBonusi + β
L
5LOCDEV_Medi + β
L
6HighLOCDEV_Highi +
βL7NumConsti + Z
0
itφ
L + τLt + 
L
it (4.4)
There is no reason to believe that incentives should aﬀect the locational choice of
startups, thus we expect βL3 = β
L
4 = 0..However, strong local development objectives
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should create a preference for local (relative to out-of-state) startups, so βL6 > β
L
5 > 0.
Finally, since government (statutory) restrictions do not typically discriminate between
in-state and out-of-state licensees, we expect βL7 = 0.
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Table 4 summarizes the qualitative predictions of the key variables of interest.
[Table 4 about here]
5. Econometric Results
5.1. License income
Table 5 summarizes the results for the license income equation. In all regressions we control
for the stock of active (non-expired) licenses, so the coeﬃcients in this equation essentially
refer to the determinants of the income per license — i.e., the ‘quality’ of licenses. As
column 1 shows, private universities generate higher income per license (about 30 percent
more) than public universities. In column 2 we add dummy variables for the use of merit
pay and bonuses (the baseline category is no incentive pay). The coeﬃcients indicate that
incentive pay strongly aﬀects license income and, as expected, the impact increases with
the strength of the incentive. While the point estimates of both coeﬃcients are positive,
the eﬀect of bonuses is more than twice as large as for merit pay. We show below that
the estimated eﬀects of incentives decline, but remain significant, when we control for
observed and unobserved heterogeneity across universities. Importantly, the coeﬃcient on
the private dummy is no longer significant once we include the incentive pay variables.
That is, private ownership aﬀects licensing performance only because it is correlated with
the adoption of high-powered incentives.
[Table 5 about here]
To control for observed heterogeneity across universities, in column 3 we introduce
variables to pick up diﬀerences both on the supply and demand sides of the licensing
activity. First, we use two controls for the technological orientation of research at the
25If there is informal government pressure to license to local rather than out-of-state startups, then
βL7 > 0.
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university — a dummy variable for whether the university has an aﬃliated medical school,
and the shares of the full-time faculty in each of six technology areas (biomedical, other
biological, chemistry, computer science, engineering and physical sciences). Second, to
pick up diﬀerences in the local demand for licenses we include a measure of the high-tech
density of the city in which the university is located — the TechPole index.
Introducing these controls for heterogeneity reduces the coeﬃcients on incentive pay,
as one might expect. The use of merit pay no longer has any eﬀect on license income.
However, while the coeﬃcient on the high powered incentive — bonuses — is reduced by
about half as compared to column 2, the estimated eﬀect is still large and statistically
strong. With these additional controls, the use of bonuses is associated with about a 40
percent increase in license income. The controls for technology orientation and demand are
also significant. The coeﬃcient on the medical school dummy is very large, reflecting the
commercial importance of biomedical research in universities. The estimated coeﬃcient
on the TechPole index confirms that local demand is also important. To illustrate the
quantitative implications, the point estimate implies that moving a university from Iowa
City to Chicago would be associated with a 12.2 percent increase in income per license
[(3.75 − 0.063) × 0.033]; moving it to Boston would further increase income per license
by 8.4 percent [(6.31 − 3.75) × 0.033]. The fact that local high-tech density matters is
interesting because it is suggests that information and/or transaction costs of licensing
are related to geography.26
To control for fixed, unobserved heterogeneity we include a measure of pre-sample
(1965-90) patenting by the university (column 4). The coeﬃcient of the pre-sample patents
is positive and highly significant. Adding the pre-sample control to the regression reduces
the estimated eﬀect of bonus pay, from 0.40 to 0.30, indicating the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity, but the coeﬃcient remains strongly significant. We also try controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity by including the average income per invention disclosure
26The diﬀerences in licensing performance are not due to diﬀerences across universities in the geographic
scope of their search for licensees. The survey asks how widely the TLO typically searches — in the local
area, state, nation or globally. The vast majority of universities resport that they search either nationally
or globally.
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over the period 1991-94 (the regression covers the sample period 1995-99). This reduces
the available sample from 86 to only 66 universities (column 5), but using this control
gives similar results to those obtained using the pre-sample patents. Since ours is the
first attempt to estimate the incentive eﬀect of performance-based pay in universities,
we cannot make any direct comparisons to previous research. But it is reassuring that
our estimated incentive eﬀect of bonus pay is very similar to the productivity impact
of introducing piece-work pay (in automobile windshield installation) in the well-known
study by Lazear (2000b).27
We next use the survey evidence on the importance the TLO attaches to local de-
velopment objectives (LOCDEV) in its licensing activity. The model predicts that such
objectives will be associated both with a lower probability of adopting incentive pay and,
at the same time lower levels of license income, conditional on whether or not incentive pay
is used. Column 5 presents the specification that includes dummy variables for medium
and strong local development objectives. As expected, universities that care most strongly
about promoting local development generate less licensing income, and the eﬀect is large
— on average, they earn nearly 30 percent less income per license. Controlling for local
development objectives marginally reduces the eﬀect of using bonus pay (from 0.30 to
0.27), but the decline in the estimated coeﬃcient is not statistically significant.
In column 6 we add the number of government constraints that the TLO reports are
either important or very important (maximum of six constraints) — which we will call
eﬀective constraints — and the interaction between this variable and a dummy variable for
whether the university (administration) frequently intervenes in the decision-making of
the TLO. If the interests of the university and the TLO are aligned, as we assumed in the
theoretical model, then university intervention should reduce the negative eﬀect of gov-
ernment intervention on licensing performance. Otherwise, university intervention should
worsen TLO performance. The results confirm that government constraints strongly aﬀect
27Using detailed worker-level data, Lazear (2000b) found that moving from hourly to piece-work pay
increased average labor productivity by 44 percent, about half of which was due to increased productivity
for existing workers and the other half to positive sorting and other factors.
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performance. The eﬀect of adding another eﬀective constraint is to reduce license income
by 17 percent. The median number of such constraints in the sample is 1.6, which implies
a reduction in license income of 27 percent.28 However, there is clear evidence that uni-
versity intervention mitigates the impact of government constraints (perhaps because the
university can help circumvent informal government intervention) — as shown by the point
estimate of 0.279 on the interaction term. For universities that intervene, the implied
marginal eﬀect of government constraints is not significantly diﬀerent from zero (the point
estimate is −0.171 + 0.279 = 0.108 with a standard error of 0.029).
In all of these specifications, we have controlled for the number of active licenses. How-
ever, if licensing is done from a larger pool of inventions, we would expect a higher average
level of license income to be generated.29 To allow for this possibility, in column 7 we add
the log of the number of faculty inventions (disclosed to the TLO). The estimated coeﬃ-
cient is positive and significant, consistent with the hypothesis that there are diminishing
returns to licensing from a given pool of inventions. Adding the number of inventions does
not aﬀect the size of the coeﬃcients on the bonus pay or local development variables. The
eﬀect of government constraints is reduced and loses statistical significance, however.
5.2. Number of Licenses
Table 6 presents the results for the annual number of licenses executed per year. In all
these regressions, we control for the annual number of inventions disclosed, so the other
coeﬃcients in the equation essentially refer to the impact on licenses per invention.30
[Table 6 about here]
A number of interesting findings emerge. First, unlike in the regressions for license
28The minimum number of important constraints reported in the sample is zero; the maximum is six.
29This argument assumes that the distribution of potential value of inventions is the same. Our controls
for technological specialisation of the faculty and the medical school dummy should help capture diﬀerences
in value distributions. We also tried adding various measures of faculty quality, such as publications and
citations per faculty (taken from the National Research Council), but these variables did not have any
significant eﬀect on license income in the regressions.
30We also included the size of the TLO (full-time professionals), but it was never statistically significant
once we control for the number of inventions from the faculty.
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income, private ownership has no significant eﬀect on the number of licenses generated
from a given pool of inventions (column 1). This finding continues to hold when we intro-
duce various controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity (columns 2-6). Second,
incentives do not have a statistically significant eﬀect on the quantity of licenses, once we
control for heterogeneity (columns 3-6). This is striking, since we found strong impacts
of bonus pay on income per license. This diﬀerence is likely due to the fact that it is
relatively easy to monitor a TLO worker’s performance in ‘quantity’ terms — how many
licenses are generated from a given number of inventions — but very diﬃcult to evaluate
performance in terms of license income because the potential value of each invention is
not known ex ante by the TLO management.31
The third finding is that local development objectives have a positive and significant
impact on the number of licenses generated, which is the opposite sign from their impact
on the level of income per license. Universities with medium local development objectives
generate, on average, 12 percent more licenses than those with no such objectives; for
strong local development focus, the increase in 28 percent. This probably reflects the fact
that strong local development focus is associated with more concern for maximizing the
number of licenses rather than license income, as evidenced by greater use of non-exclusive
licenses by universities with such objectives.
Fourth, as column 6 shows, government constraints do not have a significant impact
on the number of licenses generated. This is in sharp contrast to the significant and large
negative impact of such constraints on the income generated per license. This indicates
that government constraints impinge on the university’s ability to find the most suitable
licensee match (from their perspective), but not to license per se.
Finally, our controls for heterogeneity in university characteristics are important de-
terminants of the number of licenses per invention. First, the research orientation of the
university, as measured by faculty shares in diﬀerent technology areas, significantly aﬀects
31In the appendix, we find that when non-parametric estimation techniques are used, high-powered
incentives (bonus pay) do have a positive and significant eﬀect on the number of licenses. But the
quantitative eﬀect is much smaller than for license income, which is again consistent with the monitoring
argument made in the text.
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licensing. Second, the high tech density of the university location (TechPole) confirms that
the local demand for licenses aﬀects the ability of the TLO to strike deals. Interestingly,
the point estimates of the TechPole coeﬃcients in the licenses executed equation are almost
identical to those in the license income equation — i.e., local demand has essentially the
same impact on the quantity and quality dimensions of licensing performance. Finally, we
find that universities with medical schools generate, on average, about 11 percent fewer
licenses per invention, whereas we found that they generate about 50-70 percent more
income per license.
The key findings for the license income and number of licenses equations also hold
when we use non-parametric (propensity score matching) estimation techniques. Details
are provided in an appendix.
5.3. Number and Location of Startups
Table 7 summarises the estimates for the number and location of start-ups. The results
are strongly consistent with our predictions. Turning first to the number of startups,
we find that incentives and local development objectives have no significant eﬀect on the
choice of licensing mode — i.e., on the number of startups, conditional on the number of
new licenses executed. Second, universities which are more strongly constrained generate
fewer startups, which is consistent with the greater risk of start-ups relative to licensing to
existing firms. Third, private universities license less to startups than public institutions,
other things equal. It may be that startups are a more visible metric of activity for
public universities. On the location of startups, we find that incentives and government
constraints do not aﬀect the choice of location (conditional on licensing to a startup), but
local development objectives, and public ownership of universities, are strongly associated
with the likelihood that an in-state startup will be licensed.
[Table 7 about here]
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6. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the impact of incentives, local development objectives, and gov-
ernment constraints on the eﬀectiveness of university technology licensing activity. The
analysis is based on new survey data on technology licensing oﬃces, together with public
information on 86 U.S. universities for the period 1995-99. We develop a simple agency
model in which the university technology licensing oﬃce pursues two objectives — license
income and local development (interpreted as a preference for licensing in the local mar-
ket) — and uses performance-related (merit and bonus) pay to incentivize workers. The
model predicts that local development objectives and government constraints make the
adoption of incentive pay less likely and reduce the level of income per license, and that
universities which adopt incentive pay generate more income per license. The empirical
results are generally consistent with the predictions of the model.
The key results are as follows. First, private ownership has a large, positive eﬀect on
the adoption of incentive pay, which is robust to controls for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. In sharp contrast, private ownership has no independent eﬀect on licensing
performance, once we control for the adoption of incentive pay. Second, universities that
use bonus pay generate about 30-40 percent more income per license, controlling for uni-
versity heterogeneity. This finding shows that incentives can be important for improving
performance in both private and public institutions. Third, we find that stronger local
development objectives and government constraints are ‘costly’ in terms of the foregone
license income. Universities with strong local development objectives generate about 30
percent less income per license, but at the same time, such universities are more likely to
license to an in-state (rather than out-of-state) startup company. This evidence on the
opportunity cost of local development objectives highlights the importance of comparing
the benefits of local licensing preference to alternative policies, such as maximizing in-
come from university inventions and using the additional license income to finance local
economic development in other ways.
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7. Appendix. Nonparametric Results
We show here that nonparametric estimation methods (the propensity score matching
estimator) confirms the key parametric findings in the text. The matching estimator com-
pares the licensing outcome of interest for universities that have introduced the treatment
of interest to those that have not.32 We study the eﬀects of three treatments — adopting
incentives, having strong local development objectives, and being subject to strong gov-
ernment constraints. We use two outcome measures — income per license and the number
of licenses per invention disclosure.
Let y1i denote the outcome measure of interest for university i when treatment is
applied and y0i when it is not, Di = 1 denotes university i getting the treatment, and
yi is the outcome actually observed. We want to estimate the average causal eﬀect of
treatment (on the ‘treated’ universities), E(y1i |Di = 1)−E(y0i |Di = 1), but E(y0i |Di = 1)
is not observed since we do not have information on the same university before and after
it introduces incentive pay. The matching estimator assumes that the selection of the
treated is random, conditional on observed university characteristics, and computes the
counterfactual outcome for university i as byi =Pj ωij(pi, pj)yj where j indexes the set of
universities in the control (untreated) group, pi and pj are the predicted probabilities that
universities i and j have the treatment based on their observed characteristics, and ωij is
a weighting metric that decreases with the distance between pi and pj. We experiment
with two diﬀerent weighting metrics — the nearest neighbor and kernel methods.
7.1. License Income
Panel A in Table 8 presents results on the impact of bonus pay (columns 1-4), local
development objectives (columns 5-8) and government constraints (columns 9-12) on the
mean of log income per active license for each university.33 Since the treatment must
32For an excellent review of the literature on these techniques, see Imbens (2004).
33Two points should be noted. First, in this analysis we drop the variable for merit pay (and focus only
on bonus pay) because the the parametric results showed that it did not significantly aﬀect outcomes.
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be binary, for government constraints we analyze the diﬀerence between universities that
report at least three (out a total of six) constraints as being important or very important,
and universities that do not. In each panel we use three alternative specifications for the
first stage of the nonparametric estimation — the set of controls is larger as we move to
the right in the panel (see table notes for details).
[Table 8 about here]
The nonparametric estimates of the impact of bonus pay on income per license are in
the range of 30 to 40 percent, and statistically significant (bootstrapped standard errors
are reported). These estimates are very similar to the parametric estimates reported in
Table 5, and they are not sensitive to the controls used in the first stage estimation.
We find that strong local development objectives reduce income per license by about 45-
55 percent, and the estimates are again highly significant. These nonparametric point
estimates are larger than the parametric estimates but they are not statistically diﬀerent.
Finally, universities which are ‘constrained’ (the treated group) generate about 30 percent
less income per license, on average. The estimates are robust to the controls in the first
stage estimation, and statistically significant when we use a wider set of controls. In the
subset of treated universities, the mean number of important constraints is 3.9; for the
untreated, the mean is 0.81. Thus the nonparametric estimate corresponds to the impact
of increasing the number of constraints by 3.09. The implied marginal eﬀect of a constraint
is −0.33/3.09 = −0.11, which is similar to the parametric estimate of -0.17 in Table 5.
7.2. Number of Licenses
Panel B summarises results for the mean number of licenses executed per invention dis-
closed.34 Bonus pay has a statistically significant, positive impact on the number of licenses
Second, we also experimented with alternative license outcome measures that relax the assumption of
constant returns to scale in the number of licenses — we use log Income/(ActiveLicenses)α. Consistent
with the parametric estimates of α in Table 4, we use α = 0.8 and α = 1.2. The results are similar to
those reported in Panel A of Table 6.
34We also tried an alternative outcome measures that relax the assumption of constant returns to scale
in the number of inventions. We use log Number Licenses(InventionsDisclosed)β, for β = 0.8 as indicated
by the parametric estimates in Table 5. Results are similar to those reported in Panel B of Table 6.
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per invention, about 13 percent. This diﬀers from the parametric estimation where we
found no significant eﬀect of incentives. However, the nonparametric estimates confirm
that the eﬀect of incentives on income per license (the ‘quality’ of licenses) is about three
times larger than on the ‘quantity’ of licenses (compare columns 1-4 in Panels A and
B). This is consistent with our argument that monitoring performance on the quality of
licenses is harder than on the quantity, and thus incentives are more important and ef-
fective for quality outcomes. Next, we find that local development objectives do not have
any material impact on the number of licenses per invention. This is diﬀerent from our
findings with parametric estimation, where there was positive and statistically significant
eﬀect. Given the sensitivity of the finding to the estimation procedure, we cannot draw
any definite conclusion from theses data on how local development objectives aﬀect the
number of licenses. Finally, as with parametric estimation, we find no eﬀect of government
constraints on the number of licenses.
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Variable Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max
Licensing income, '000 5686 1289 14362 0 148938
Licenses executed 29.1 16 33.9 0 218
Inventions disclosed 87.7 66 78.4 0 476
Licensing income per 
active license 38.9 15.6 143.2 2.9 1327
Licenses executed per 
invention disclosed 5.2 3.5 5.5 0.31 27.6
Full-time TLO 
employees 6.8 4.8 5.9 0.5 27.7
TLO age 12 9 13.3 1 71
TechPole 1.7 0.38 3.19 0.001 23.7
Total Startups 2.8 2 3.74 0 31
In-state Startups 2.5 1 3.47 0 25
Pre-sample patents 
stock 169.1 65 326.8 0 2492
Dummy for Private 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
Dummy for Merit Pay 0.41 0 0.49 0 1
Dummy for Bonus Pay 0.17 0 0.38 0 1
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium 0.43 0 0.49 0 1
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High 0.34 0 0.48 0 1
NumConst 1.5 1 1.6 0 6
Dummy for MedSchool 0.66 1 0.48 0 1
Note: monetary values are in thousands of 1996 US dollars. 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for main variables
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its licensing 
activity. NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as being moderately 
or very important (based on six different constraints listed in the survey).
Variable Number of universities
Dummy for 
Private
Full-time TLO 
employees TechPole
Incentives
No incentives 36 0.14 4.70 1.23
Merit pay 35 0.37 6.90 1.14
Bonus pay 15 0.40 9.60 3.53
Local objectives
LOCDEV=Low 20 0.45 5.82 1.62
LOCDEV=Medium 37 0.30 7.19 1.64
LOCDEV=High 29 0.14 6.06 1.52
Gov't constraints
NumConst<3 66 0.36 7.40 1.64
NumConst≥3 20 0.00 3.60 1.44
Table 2
Incentives, Local Development Objectives and Government Constraints
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its 
licensing activity. NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as 
being moderately or very important (based on six different constraints listed in the survey). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy for Private 0.812*** 0.935*** 0.851** 0.641
(0.0331) (0.373) (0.404) (0.437)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium -0.285 -0.360
(0.393) (0.392)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High 0.148 0.043
(0.399) (0.408)
NumConst -0.141 -0.215**
(0.113) (0.102)
TechPole 0.003 -0.035 -0.022 0.014
(0.055) (0.053) (0.061) (0.065)
Dummy for MedSchool 0.381 0.132 0.077 0.029
(0.371) (0.400) (0.415) (0.412)
Technology area faculty 
shares Yes*** Yes** Yes* Yes*
(F=15.78) (F=11.22) (F=10.58) (F=10.06)
Pre-sample patents stock 0.249** 0.254** 0.252**
(0.109) (0.110) (0.108)
Dummy for Canada -0.305 0.005 0.056 -0.027
(0.555) (0.597) (0.564) (0.525)
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.182 0.231 0.253 0.237
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its 
licensing activity. NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as 
being moderately or very important (based on six different constraints listed in the survey). 
Table 3
The determinants of adoption of high-powered incentives
Dependent variable: Dummy for Performance-Based Pay, Probit estimation (86 universities)
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and AR(1) serial correlation. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
License 
income 
Number of 
licenses
Total 
startups
Local 
startups
Performance-Based Pay Positive Positive Zero Zero
Local Objectives Negative Positive Zero Positive
Constraints Negative Zero Negative Zero
Table 4
Econometric predictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(active licenses) 1.256*** 1.184*** 1.028*** 0.917*** 0.959*** 1.012*** 0.760*** 0.725***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.064) (0.065)
Dummy for Private 0.315*** 0.161 0.094 0.156 0.077 0.212 0.117 0.299*
(0.103) (0.108) (0.146) (0.144) (0.142) (0.157) (0.142) (0.154)
Dummy for Merit Pay 0.324*** -0.022 -0.111 -0.079 -0.011 0.037 -0.016
(0.089) (0.109) (0.118) (0.117) (0.123) (0.118) (0.166)
Dummy for Bonus Pay 0.778*** 0.401*** 0.304** 0.274** 0.468*** 0.493*** 0.495***
(0.126) (0.128) (0.139) (0.139) (0.155) (0.131) (0.161)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium 0.005 -0.145 -0.170 0.073
(0.117) (0.131) (0.117) (0.137)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High -0.288** -0.317*** -0.261** 0.015
(0.131) (0.133) (0.119) (0.159)
NumConst -0.171*** -0.061 -0.231***
(0.058) (0.051) (0.082)
NumConst x Univ 
Intervene 0.279*** 0.195*** 0.317***
(0.046) (0.042) (0.078)
Pre-sample patents stock 0.159*** 0.120*** 0.088** 0.049 -0.034
(0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.044)
Dummy for MedSchool 0.803*** 0.645*** 0.587*** 0.712*** 0.481*** 0.771***
(0.109) (0.115) (0.112) (0.116) (0.105) (0.143)
TechPole 0.049*** 0.037** 0.041*** 0.026 0.033*** 0.044***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Technology area faculty shares Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
(F=21.64) (F=19.69) (F=21.79) (F=23.05) (F=22.71) (F=27.16)
log(inventions disclosed) 0.549***
(0.073)
Pre log(licensing income) 0.352***
(0.067)
Dummy for Canada -0.355 -0.288 -0.609** -0.463 -0.463 -0.523* -0.297 0.099
(0.248) (0.256) (0.299) (0.308) (0.317) (0.305) (0.291) (0.211)
Number of universities 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 66
Number of observations 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 422
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its licensing activity. NumConst is the number of state 
government constraints that the university reports as being moderately or very important (based on six different constraints listed in the survey). 'Univ 
Intervene' is a dummy that receives the value of 1 if the TLO says that the university 'usually' or 'always' intervenes in the decision-making of the TLO. Pre 
log(licensing income) is computed over the period 1991-1995 for 66 universities for which such information exists.
Table 5
The effect of incentives, objectives and constraints on licensing income
Dependent variable: log(licensing income), GLS estimation
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and AR(1) serial correlation. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include a complete set of year dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6)
log(inventions disclosed) 0.855*** 0.849*** 0.838*** 0.754*** 0.744*** 0.756*** 0.583***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.054)
Dummy for Private 0.089 0.072 -0.039 -0.101 -0.042 0.017 0.027
(0.059) (0.065) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.075) (0.070)
Dummy for Merit Pay 0.023 0.058 0.039 0.023 0.055 0.113
(0.069) (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.080)
Dummy for Bonus Pay 0.136* 0.123 0.069 0.068 0.113 0.235***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.081) (0.081)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium 0.127* 0.117* 0.110*
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High 0.288*** 0.282*** 0.233***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.078)
NumConst 0.038 -0.018
(0.033) (0.039)
NumConst x Univ 
Intervene 0.007 0.059
(0.031) (0.038)
Pre-sample patents stock 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.096*** -0.029
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029)
Dummy for MedSchool -0.091 -0.120* -0.129** -0.116* -0.071*
(0.067) (0.069) (0.067) (0.068) (0.078)
TechPole 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.014***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Technology area faculty shares Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
(F=41.95) (F=38.56) (F=40.75) (F=43.53) (F=22.11)
Pre log(licenses executed) 1.039***
(0.146)
Dummy for Canada -0.089 -0.100 -0.443*** -0.239 -0.324* -0.163 0.121
(0.119) (0.118) (0.175) (0.176) (0.180) (0.193) (0.146)
Number of universities 86 86 86 86 86 86 66
Number of observations 518 518 518 518 518 518 422
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its licensing activity. 
NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as being moderately or very important 
(based on six different constraints listed in the survey). 'Univ Intervene' is a dummy that receives the value of 1 if the TLO 
says that the university 'usually' or 'always' intervenes in the decision-making of the TLO. Pre log(licenses executed) is 
computed over the period 1991-1995 for 66 universities for which such information exists.
Table 6
The effect of incentives, objectives and constraints on number of licenses executed
Dependent variable: log(licenses executed), GLS estimation
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and AR(1) serial correlation. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include a complete set of year dummies. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(inventions disclosed) 0.667*** 0.655*** 0.649*** 0.512*** 0.534*** 0.571***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.092) (0.071) (0.074) (0.083)
log(licenses executed) 0.249*** 0.247*** 0.238***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.073)
Total Startups 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.105***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Dummy for Private -0.105 -0.107 -0.210** -0.326*** -0.322*** -0.378***
(0.120) (0.118) (0.104) (0.081) (0.080) (0.098)
Dummy for Merit Pay -0.034 -0.039 0.068 0.035 0.045 0.043
(0.127) (0.129) (0.119) (0.092) (0.092) (0.096)
Dummy for Bonus Pay -0.186 -0.192 -0.154 0.012 0.024 -0.093
(0.155) (0.159) (0.138) (0.090) (0.091) (0.110)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=Medium -0.150 -0.147 -0.166 0.177 0.176* 0.173*
(0.169) (0.165) (0.125) (0.106) (0.105) (0.104)
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High -0.007 -0.003 -0.096 0.233** 0.232** 0.200**
(0.176) (0.172) (0.126) (0.122) (0.123) (0.110)
NumConst -0.132*** -0.128** -0.149*** -0.044 -0.049 -0.042
(0.054) (0.057) (0.054) (0.049) (0.049) (0.053)
NumConst x Univ 
Intervene 0.067 0.065 0.073 0.006 0.009 0.003
(0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
Pre-sample patents stock 0.128 -0.011 -0.023 -0.033
(0.041) (0.036) (0.026) (0.027)
Dummy for MedSchool -0.148 0.033
(0.103) (0.091)
TechPole 0.031*** 0.016
(0.010) (0.010)
Technology area faculty shares Yes* Yes
(F=9.62) (F=5.47)
Number of universities 86 86 86 86 86 86
Number of observations 518 518 518 518 518 518
LOCDEV measures the weight the university attaches to local/regional development objectives in its licensing 
activity. NumConst is the number of state government constraints that the university reports as being moderately or 
very important (based on six d
Table 7
The effect of incentives, objectives and constraints on number and location of startups
Dependent variable: Total Startups and Local Startups, Negative Binomial model
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and AR(1) serial correlation . ***, ** and  * 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Total Startups Local Startups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dummy for Bonus Pay 0.432** 0.386** 0.138* 0.118*
(0.159) (0.099) (0.058) (0.059)
Obs=0 71 71 71 71
Obs=1 15 15 15 15
Dummy for 
LOCDEV=High -0.548** -0.421** 0.065 0.038
(0.275) (0.256) (0.055) (0.060)
Obs=0 57 57 57 57
Obs=1 29 29 29 29
Dummy for 
NumConst≥3 -0.335 -0.341* -0.045 -0.038
(0.195) (0.161) (0.059) (0.046)
Obs=0 20 20 20 20
Obs=1 66 66 66 66
Weighting method Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour Kernel 
Nearest-
neighbour
Table 8
Non-parametric propensity-score estimation: 86 Universities
Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Obs=1 is the number of observations for which the "treatment" applies (e.g., the universities that have bonus pay). Obs=0 is the number of observations for the "untreated" 
universities. In the second stage, observations are weighed using the kernel method.
The first stage regression for the Dummy for Bonus Pay is as reported in column 2 of Table 2. Analogous specifications are used for Dummy for LOCDEV=High and Dummy for 
NumConst≥3. That is, for LOCDEV=High, we include the bonus pay dummy and delete the LOCDEV dummies; for NumConst≥3, we include the bonus pay dummy and delete the 
NumConst variable. 
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